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Abstract: To capture the common features of diverse fundamentalist movements, overcome 
etymological variability, and assess predictors, religious fundamentalism is conceptualized as 
a set of beliefs about and attitudes toward religion, expressed in a disciplinarian deity, 
literalism, exclusivity, and intolerance. Evidence from representative samples of over 23,000 
adults in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Turkey, supports 
the conclusion that fundamentalism is stronger in countries where religious liberty is lower, 
religion less fractionalized, state structure less fragmented, regulation of religion greater, and 
the national context less globalized. Among individuals within countries, fundamentalism is 
linked to religiosity, confidence in religious institutions, belief in religious modernity, belief 
in conspiracies, xenophobia, fatalism, weaker liberal values, trust in family and friends, 
reliance on less diverse information sources, lower socioeconomic status, and membership in 
ethnic majority, or dominant religion/sect. We discuss implications of these findings for 
understanding fundamentalism and the need for further research. 
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Introduction 
The literature on religious fundamentalism has considerably expanded in recent 
decades. Yet, three major challenges continue to hamper establishing empirical generalization 
and theoretical abstraction concerning its predictors on the country and individual levels. 
First, the movements so characterized vary historically, cross-nationally, and across religions. 
Examples of such variability are numerous, particularly in contemporary Muslim-majority 
countries: the Society of the Muslim Brothers in Arab countries, Jama’at Islami in Pakistan, 
Front Islamique du Salut in Algeria, the Taliban in Afghanistan, the National Islamic Front in 
the Sudan, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, al-Shabaab in Somalia, and Boko Haram in Nigeria in 
Sunni Islam; the Fedayeen-e Islam and the followers of Ayatollah Khomeini, the Hezbollah 
in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen in Shia Islam. Also included are such myriad 
transnational terror groups as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Ahmad 
1964; Mitchell 1969; Sivan 1985; Kepel 1985; Roy 1994; Almond, Appleby, and Sivan 
2003).  
Complicating the subject is the etymological variability and ambiguity of the term 
itself. While fundamentalism is traced to some Christian churches in twentieth-century US 
(Marsden 1980; Wills 1990; Smith 1998) and leading some to argue against its usage in Islam 
(Esposito 1992), others have argued that the construct is still preferable over the alternatives 
to identify similar types of movements in Judaism, Islam, and other religious traditions 
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and operational definition of fundamentalism that is multi-dimensional and thus goes beyond 
the existing approaches in Christianity (Altemeyer 2003; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2004) 
and Islam (Moaddel and Karabenick 2008, 2013) and is generalizable to the Abrahamic 
faiths. 
Finally, while scholars have moved beyond single cases to detect general 
―transnational, transcultural‖ patterns of religious fundamentalism (Emerson and Hartman 
2006:130; Munson 1989; Lawrence 1989; Riesebrodt 1993; Antoun 2008; Almond, Appleby, 
Sivan 2003), their definitions vary widely and are sometimes constructed in terms that 
overlook its religious character; that is, fundamentalism is considered (a) a reaction to 
secularization (Almond, Appleby, Sivan 2003; Kaplan 1992), (b) ―an orientation to the 
modern world‖ (Antoun 2008:2; Lawrence 1989), (c) ―a style of political participation‖ 
(Lustick 1988:5), (d) ―an urban movement directed primarily against the dissolution of 
personalistic, patriarchal notions of order‖ (Riesebrodt 1993:9), and (e) a ―hierarchy, 
patriarchy, discipline, and seclusion‖ (Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai 2005:25). Aspects of these 
definitions are also often conflated with propositional statements concerning the causes of 
fundamentalism; for example, that fundamentalism is a reaction to modernization (Emerson 
and Hartman 2006:134; Almond, Sivan, Appleby 1995), or an urban movement to protect a 
patriarchal order (Riesebrodt 1993).  
RECONCEPTUALIZING RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM 
To overcome these limitations, we propose that fundamentalists, despite their 
diversity and often irreconcilable differences—such as those found between Christian and 
Muslim or Shia and Sunni variants—share core orientations toward their own and other‘s 
religions (Altemeyer 2003; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2004; Schwartz and Lindley 2005; 
Summers 2006; Moaddel and Karabenick 2008, 2013). We conceptualize these core 
orientations as a distinctive set of beliefs and attitudes that rests on a disciplinarian 
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conception of the deity, a literal reading of the scriptures, religious exclusivity, and 
intolerance. Focusing on the Abrahamic faiths, fundamentalist beliefs and attitudes are 
distinguishable from the basic tenets of these faiths that the adherents unquestionably accept.  
These tenets in (Shia and Sunni) Islam, for example, include the belief in the oneness of God, 
the Prophecy of Muhammad, the Quran as the word God, and the Resurrection and Day of 
Judgment. In Christianity, they are the belief in the Trinitarian notion of God as Father, Son, 
and the Holy Spirit, Jesus as the Son of God, and the Virgin Mary. Muslim or Christian 
fundamentalists certainly believe in the tenets of their own religion. But the belief that their 
religion is closer to God than other religions, that only Muslims or Christians will go to 
heaven, that God severely punishes people even though they have engaged in only a minor 
infraction of religious laws, or that the Quran or the Bible is literally true—all constitute 
fundamentalist beliefs, because they display distinctive religious orientations rather than 
asserting specific tenets of either faith.  
Fundamentalism also differs from religious conservatism (Belcher et al. 2004). For 
some, fundamentalism is a subset of conservatism, such as conservative Protestants 
(Woodberry and Smith 1998), and for others, it is similar to conservatism (Glass and Jacobs 
2005; Glass and Nath 2006). However, a clearer conceptualization and more precise 
measurement of the term, which are necessary for a better understanding of the subject 
(Woodberry and Smith 1998), require considering fundamentalism and conservatism as 
distinct phenomena. The latter is primarily concerned with social issues and preserving the 
norms associated with the religious tradition such as those governing gender relations and 
communal practices (Grasmick, Wilcox, & Bird 1990; Smith 1998; Davidman 1991; Hawley 
1994), whereas fundamentalism is a distinctive orientation toward one‘s and others‘ religion 
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Finally, our conceptualization is deemed preferable to the single-factor conceptions of 
fundamentalism, primarily those defined solely on text-based inerrancy or intratextuality 
(e.g., Williamson et al. 2010). The latter exclusively focuses on the scriptures, which is only 
one facet of religions. Rather, religions are multifaceted, consisting of beliefs in supernatural 
forces or entities that are codified in the scriptures, embodied in saints and religious leaders, 
grounded in organizations, objectified in symbols and sartorial regimes, supported by the 
communities of the faithful (e.g., the abode of Islam, Christendom), enacted in periodic 
rituals, and affirmed or referred to in daily conversations. A multidimensional conception of 
the term that considers these multiple aspects of religion is more stable across individuals and 
nations than fundamentalism as simply inerrancy. We thus suggest four inter-related 
components that together constitute fundamentalist orientations. These are beliefs in: (a) a 
disciplinarian deity — a God who rewards the faithful and punishes in Hell those who fail to 
follow His instructions;
1
 (b) the inerrancy of the scriptures—the belief in the scriptures as a 
comprehensive system of universal truth and historical accuracy (e.g., the Chicago Statement 
                                                          
1
 On the face of it, this component applies to only theistic (Abrahamic) religions. 
Nonetheless, given the fundamentalists‘ preoccupation with God‘s retributions—rewards and 
punishments—a parallel may be established between fundamentalisms in theistic and 
atheistic religions of the East, like Buddhism, Hinduism, and Jainism. The concept of karma 
used in varied ways in these religions also revolves on rewards and punishments. We thus 
propose that in the same way that fundamentalists in the Abrahamic faiths may be concerned 
over how their actions in this life would bring about God‘s retributions on the judgment‘s 
day, fundamentalists in Eastern religions may also worry about how their misdeeds in this life 
would result in misfortune in the next and how strict adherence to the teachings of their 
religions may alleviate such sufferings (BBC 2018; Paine 1997; Faure 2009; Bronkhorst 
2011). 
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of Biblical Inerrancy 1978), that is superior to science; (c) religious exclusivity —the belief 
that one‘s faith is decidedly superior to other faiths and that only the faithful members of 
one‘s religion ―will enjoy religious rewards and compensators‖ (Sherkat 2014:24); and (d) 
religious intolerance
2
 —that the faithful restrict interaction with the followers of other faiths, 
maintain religious boundaries to keep the faith pure, and limit the rights of other religions. 
Although the strength of these components may vary among individuals and groups, we 
propose that they are coterminous with one another and form a single fundamentalism 
construct. 
These features were present in such historically specific forms of fundamentalism as 
the movements for the rehabilitation of Islam that followed the teachings of Muhammad Ibn 
Abdul Wahhab (1703–1787) in Arabia and Shah Waliallah (1703–1762) in India. Firmly 
believing that impurity had crept into the faith, these movements advocated a return to the 
fundamentals of Islam practiced by the first generation of Muslims, revitalized the notion of 
the oneness of God to attack the prerogative of the ruling elite, and demanded the formation 
of an Islamic state in order to protect the purity of the Islamic community from the influence 
of other cultures, which for Shah Waliallahis meant the folkways and mores of the Hindus, 
and for the Wahhabis the Ottomans and the Shia (Ahmad 1967; Malik 1980; Hourani 1982; 
Moaddel 2005).  
                                                          
2
 We realize that a multi-dimensional conception of fundamentalism that is too closely related 
to its historical context (i.e., too concrete and specific) and its components which vary 
independently of one another may be less stable than a single dimension, as shown in the 
debate over the church-sect typology (Johnson 1963). The multi-dimensional conception 
employed here is general and abstract, and its components significantly correlate with one 
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These religious orientations were revived by Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949), the 
founder of the Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, and Abul Ala Maududi (1903-1979), 
the founder of Jamaati Islami in India and Pakistan. For Banna, ―the provision of Islam and 
its teachings are all inclusive, encompassing the affairs of the people in this world and the 
hereafter....Islam is a faith and a ritual, a nation…and a nationality, a religion and a state, 
spirit and deed, holy text and sword‖ (Mitchell 1969:232). His followers were mobilized to 
repel what they considered an assault on Islam by secular intellectuals and Christian 
missionaries (Banna 1978; Lia 1998). Likewise, Maududi‘s fundamentalism opposed first the 
nationalist stand of Muslim theologians in India and later the Pakistan movement for 
independence, claiming that Muslims were not a national entity but a jamaat governed by the 
immutable and everlasting divine law. Advancing a literalist exegesis of the Quran, he argued 
that God was not only the creator, but also the only absolute ruler and legislator for human 
society (Ahmad 1967). Maududi ―did not stand for the political freedom or self-determination 
of Muslims, but for the rule of Islam, for a purely Islamic, traditionalist-fundamentalist 
theocracy‖ (Ahmad 1967:224).  
In Shia Islam, Fedayeen-e Islam, formed in Iran in 1944, was among the sect‘s first 
expressions of contemporary fundamentalism. Warning that the society had strayed from the 
right path, they called for a strict application of the sharia: prohibitions of alcohol, tobacco, 
opium, films, gambling, and wearing of foreign clothing; enforcement of amputation of hands 
of thieves and the veiling of women; and eliminating non-Islamic subjects from school 
curricula. They also demanded restricting the activities of Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians, 
and totally banning the Bahais (Abrahamian 1982; Kazemi 2012). Another manifestation of 
Shia fundamentalism was the Hojjatieh Society (formed in 1953) to combat the spread of the 
Bahai faith. Like fundamentalist Christians, it displayed a millenarianism penchant, and 
similar to the Muslim Brothers, it employed a modern organizational and sartorial style (Sadri 
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2012). After the Iranian Revolution, the fundamentalists were closely associated with the 
belief in clerical absolutism and Shia sectarianism.  Finally, Osulgarayan (translated as 
Principalists, Sanandaji 2009) became the nom de guerre of a group of fundamentalist 
parliamentarians who wanted to distinguish themselves from the reformists. 
Despite their differences, these movements were similar in orientations; believing in a 
total submission to the sharia, Islam as a complete system of truth, and religious exclusivity 
and intolerance. We measure these orientations, examine the factors linked to cross-national 
and individual variation in fundamentalism, and discuss the implications of this study for a 
broader understanding of the subject. 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Fundamentalism varies among individuals; some strongly believe in a disciplinarian 
deity, the inerrancy of the scripture, religious exclusivity, and superiority of their faith over 
other faiths. Others manifest these beliefs to a lesser extent, and some, such as atheists, not at 
all. Part of this variation may be due to factors operating at broader sociopolitical and cultural 
contexts that affect everyone, including globalization, state structures and policies, and the 
religious profile of the country, and another part related to variation in individual attributes 
and attitudes. We specify and assess these factors in order to uncover and explain the pattern 
of variation in religious fundamentalism not only among individuals but also cross-nationally. 
Explaining Cross-National Variation in Fundamentalism 
We draw on Moaddel‘s (2005) episodic-discourse model to explain cross-national 
variation in religious fundamentalism. Moaddel contrasts modernism and fundamentalism as 
opposing orientations of Muslim intellectuals toward significant issues. Among these issues 
are the role of rational reasoning in Islam, secular government, the social status of women, 
and Western culture. Islamic modernists followed rational exegesis of the Quran, supported 
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considered Western culture progressive. Islamic fundamentalists, by contrast, followed a 
literal reading of the Quran, supported the unity of religion and politics in an Islamic 
government, favored male supremacy and patriarchy, and considered West as culturally 
decadent. 
Moaddel (2005) contends that these diverse orientations were a function of variation 
in (a) cultural context from pluralistic to monolithic and (b) state intervention in culture from 
low to high. He then proposes that Muslim intellectual leaders developed modernist 
orientations in Egypt and India in the second half of the nineteenth century because they 
encountered a plurality of discourses advanced by followers of the Enlightenment, 
Westernizers and think-tanks connected to colonial administration, the missionaries, and the 
ulama—all competing for the intellectual control of the society, while state intervention in 
culture was limited. The rise of fundamentalism in twentieth-century Algeria, Egypt, Iran, 
and Syria, on the other hand, was a reaction to the monolithic secular discourse imposed from 
above by the authoritarian ideological state (Moaddel 2005). 
Fundamentalism defined as disciplinarian deity, literalism, and religious exclusivity 
and intolerance reflects a distinctive religious orientation that is different from the definition 
of the term as orientations toward sociopolitical and cultural issues. The latter are indicators 
of liberalism-conservatism continuum and considered as predictors of fundamentalism. 
However, some of the key elements of Moaddel‘s model are relevant for explaining cross-
national variation of the phenomenon. First, we propose that pluralistic contexts, inclusive of 
both secular and religious options for seekers of spirituality, weakens fundamentalism, 
because this context is likely to offer a richer menu of options to satisfy a wider range of 
spiritual needs (Montgomery 2003). As a result, fewer of these ―spiritual shoppers‖ 
(Wuthnow 2005) would be willing to adopt fundamentalism. Furthermore, a pluralistic 
context exposes the public to a greater number of perspectives on life, security, and 
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happiness, reinforcing views concerning the varied ways that metaphysical entities may be 
worshiped.  People are thus less likely to follow a disciplinarian deity and a literal, 
exclusivist, and intolerant reading of religion (Berger and Luckman 1969).  Religious 
monopolies, on the other hand, may contribute to religious fundamentalism through 
mobilizing resources, the sanctioning of religious behavior, punishing religious 
nonobservance, and exploiting sectarian rivalries (Handy 1991; Breault 1989; Blau, Land, 
and Redding 1992; Blau, Redding, and Land 1993; Ellison & Sherkat 1995b). 
The authoritarian secular state is another aspect of the social context that may shape 
fundamentalism. Two features of the state are relevant for understanding the relation of 
religious fundamentalism with regimes. One is the state‘s regulation of religion. 
Fundamentalism may arise as a reaction to such interventions. By launching cultural 
programs to promote secular institutions, such as fostering national identity as a substitute for 
religious identity, or instituting laws that run contrary to religious beliefs, a secular state may 
contribute to the perception among the faithful that their religion is under siege, core values 
offended, and religious freedom obstructed. This perception of besieged spirituality may 
activate religious awareness that prompts individuals to grow ―hypersensitive even to the 
slightest hint of theological corruption within their own ranks‖ (Smith 1998:8), use religious 
categories to frame issues, and adopt alarmist attitudes and conspiratorial perspectives 
(Moaddel and Karabenick 2013). While different conceptions of God may coexist in a society 
(Froese and Bader 2010), the perceived urgency to rise in defense of  ―His dominion‖ and 
combat the all-powerful secular state may popularize among the public an authoritarian 
conception of deity who handsomely rewards the faithful and severely punishes the 
unbelievers. As Almond, Appleby, and Sivan (2003:19-20) stated, fundamentalists ―fashion 
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Fundamentalism may also be influenced by the structure of an authoritarian state. The 
premise that state structures shape religious outcomes has a long pedigree in the sociology of 
religion. For example, the success of Protestantism in sixteenth-century Europe is linked to 
variation in the structure of political sovereignty (Swanson 1967) or state autonomy 
(Wuthnow 1985). Here, we argue that consequential for the rise of fundamentalism is the 
extent to which the structure of power relation is unified or fragmented. An authoritarian state 
under a unified elite would be more effective in imposing a monolithic religion on the subject 
population, which would limit the available secular or alternative religious options for the 
seekers of spirituality. An authoritarian state that is controlled by a fragmented elite, on the 
other hand, tends to experience inter-elite rivalries and acrimonious debates (Moaddel 2016). 
Such internal disputes would not only diminish the state‘s ability to impose religious 
uniformity on society, but also generate the social space that permits the growth of an 
alternative religious or secular movement (Wuthnow 1989).  
In sum, an authoritarian state with a unified structure strengthens and a fragmented 
structure weakens fundamentalism. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia provide contrasting examples. While both regimes are remarkably similar in religious 
sectarianism, repressiveness, and oil as their sources of revenue, the ruling elite is fragmented 
in Iran but unified in Saudi Arabia. The rise of liberalism and religious reformism in Iran 
(Rajaee 2007; Kamrava 2008; Moaddel 2009) and fundamentalism in Saudi Arabia 
(Dekmejian 1994; Okruhlik 2002; Champion 2003; Moaddel 2006) appears to correspond to 
the difference in the structure of power relation between the two regimes.  
Finally, globalization may weaken fundamentalism by contributing to the 
diversification of culture. The development of digital communication technology and the 
means of mass transportation reduce the constraints of geography on social interactions 
(Waters 1995), intensifying ―worldwide social relations‖ (Giddens 1990:64) and expanding 
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intercontinental networks of economic, political, and cultural interdependence among nations 
(Keohane and Nye 2000; Frankel 2000; Sassen 2001). These developments globalize 
economic activities and enhance the diffusion of cultures and civilizational osmoses, 
facilitating access to diverse information sources, undermining religious monopolies, and 
thus weakening fundamentalism. 
Alternatively, fundamentalism may even be an outcome of globalization by: (a) 
intensifying the clash of civilizations (Huntington 1996); (b) breaking down the protective 
shields of small communities as a result of the efforts to eliminate barriers to the world 
markets, employing similar organizational structures (Stohl 2005), and enforcing a 
homogeneous cultural pattern (Ritzer 1993), which trigger the feeling of alienation and 
insecurity (Giddens 1991, Kinnvall 2004); and (c) expanding inequality through the 
incorporation of the indigenous economies into the global hierarchy of asymmetrical 
exchange relations of the world capitalist system (Wallerstein 2000).   
Individual Variation in Religious Fundamentalism  
To explain cross-national variation in fundamentalism, we focus on religious freedom 
and fractionalization, state regulation of religion, fragmentation of state authoritarian 
structure, and globalization. On the individual level, we consider the potential influence of: 
(a) religiosity, trust in religious institutions, and religious modernity; (b) liberal values; (c) 
hostility toward outsiders; (d) fatalism; (e) information sources; and (f) demographics. 
First, it is evident that without religion, religious fundamentalism may not exist 
(Peshkin 1988; Ammerman 1987; Kellstedt and Smidt 1991; Lapidus 1992; Lewis 1993; 
Blaydes and Linzer 2008). Higher religiosity may thus be linked to stronger fundamentalism. 
Moreover, people with greater confidence in religious institutions are more likely to self-
restrict to such institutions for information and guidance, develop a stronger monolithic view 





This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
  
religious beliefs foster development—espousing religious modernity—may develop a 
stronger attitude against secular change, have a more holistic view of religion, and a stronger 
fundamentalist orientation. Second, fundamentalism is also linked to the conservative and 
patriarchal values as well as submission to religious rule (Lawrence 1989; Kaplan 1992; 
Riesebrodt 1993; Almond, Appleby, Sivan 2003; Antoun 2008; Moaddel 2005). As a 
corollary of this argument, we propose that individuals who support the liberal values of 
expressive individualism, gender equality, and secular politics are more likely to express 
doubt about the truth of religion and less likely to espouse fundamentalism.  
Third, as shown by social science research, hostility toward outsiders, or xenophobia, 
and the belief in conspiracies are linked to rightwing solidarity and religious fundamentalism 
(Pipes 1996; Euben 1999; Zeidan 2001; Maehr and Karabenick 2005; Inglehart, Moaddel, 
and Tessler 2006; Choueiri 2010; Bermanis et al. 2010; Koopmans 2014). We further test 
these hypotheses by assessing their relationships with fundamentalism across eight countries. 
Likewise, fourth, the belief in obedience to a disciplinarian God and the necessity of 
surrendering unconditionally to Him may also be stronger among fatalistic individuals, who 
consider their fate as firmly established and that there is little one can do to change it (Ford 
1962; Quinney 1964; Booth 1991; Mercier 1995; Ellerbe 1995; Cohen-Mor 2001; Brink and 
Mencher 2014).  
Fifth, individuals who rely more on family and friends (Ellison 1995; Sherkat 1995) 
as a source of information concerning religion are less likely to avail themselves of other and 
more diverse sources, and more likely to espouse stronger fundamentalism. On the other 
hand, those who rely on diverse sources of information are more likely to be exposed to a 
variety of perspectives on religion. As a result, they tend to develop a general awareness of 
the existence of a plurality of belief systems and alternative venues for spiritual satisfaction, 
and as a consequence, are less likely to espouse religious fundamentalism. 
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Finally, among demographics, social class, ethnic and religious identity, urban-rural 
residence may all be linked to fundamentalism. We argue that higher education and income 
are likely to weaken fundamentalism; education is said to lower cognitive barriers to 
enlightenment. The educated are more skilled in analyzing issues, assessing alternative 
perspectives, and making sense of the world autonomously than those less educated 
(Schussman and Soule 2005; Krueger and Malečková 2003). They are thus less likely to 
espouse a literalist, exclusivist, and intolerant view of religion, compared to those with lower 
levels of education. Also, individuals with higher incomes are less likely to harbor 
fundamentalist beliefs given their greater access to more diverse cultural perspectives and 
networks. Lower income individuals, on the other hand, are more likely to support 
fundamentalism (Blaydes and Linzer 2008; Mehmet 1990; Ayubi 1991; Almond, Appleby, 
Sivan 2003; Gaskins, Golder, and Siegel 2013). Experiencing a higher level of status 
insecurity (Weber 1964; Caudill 1963; Weller 1965; Shapiro 1978; Coreno 2002), they are 
more likely to support the communitarianism of religious fundamentalism (Davis and 
Robinson 2006).  
Inequality in terms of ethnicity and religion or religious sect may also have 
ramifications for fundamentalism. Parallel to the view that relates prejudice by the members 
of the dominant ethnic group to their perception of threat from other groups (Blumer 1958; 
Quillian 1995; Bobo and Hutchings 1996), we assess whether members of the dominant 
ethnic group are also more strongly fundamentalist than are ethnic minorities. Likewise, we 
expect that fundamentalism to be higher among members of the dominant religion or 
religious sect because of their claimed ownership of religion and the perception that religious 
minorities have deviated from the true path and therefore pose a threat to their religion. 
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taking a more moderate religious stand would be accommodating toward the dominant 
religion and thus reduces religious tensions.  
People living in rural areas, with limited access to a more diversified religious 
environment, may display stronger fundamentalism than those in urban areas. Finally, to rule 
out the possibility of spurious functions of employment, age, gender, and marital status, we 
statistically control for these variables. 
METHOD 
Sample and Survey Procedure 
Using a multi-stage probability sampling design, face-to-face interviews were 
conducted of a nationally representative sample of 3,143 adult (age 18+) Egyptians, 3,000 
Iraqis, 3,008 Jordanians, 3,034 Lebanese, 3,523 Pakistanis, 1,635 Saudis, 3,070 Tunisians, 
and 3,019 Turkish in 2011-2016. They add up to over 23,000 completed interviews, 
representing four hundred million or 26% of the 1.6 billion world Muslim populations in 
2010.
3
 Egypt and Lebanon have sizable Christian populations. A team of investigators 
developed the questionnaire in collaboration with researchers from the eight countries.
4
 To 
ensure consistency of meaning across the countries, the questionnaire was translated from 
English into Arabic, Kurdish, Pashto, Urdu, and Turkish, back translated into English by 
someone who had not seen the original version, and compared with the original English 
version. Table 1 shows the sample size, fieldwork date, response rate, and the organization 
that carried out the survey in each country, and Table 2 provides the respondents‘ 
demographics. 
Table 1 about here 
                                                          
3
 See http://www.prb.org/Publications/Articles/2011/muslim-population-growth.aspx. 
4
 For a copy of the data and the questionnaire, see https://mevs.org/data/survey-
summary/1004. 
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Table 2 about here 
Measurement 
Religious Fundamentalism 
Adhering to the stipulation that a multidimensional conception of fundamentalism 
more effectively captures the diverse manner in which the subject may be manifested vis-à-
vis sundry aspects of religion, we operationalized the four components in terms of a series of 
items that were intended to grasp the multiple meanings linked to each of the components: 
deity, inerrancy, exclusivity, and intolerance. Initially, our research team developed a total of 
25 items with a Likert-scale response format (coded as ―strongly agree‖ = 4, ―agree‖ = 3, 
―disagree‖ = 2, and ―strongly disagree‖ = 1). Muslim respondents were asked about the 
Quran, Islam, and Muslims, while Christian respondents about the Bible, Christianity, and 
Christians. Although we were not allowed to use some of the items in Egypt, no more than 
one of the excluded items in Egypt, identified with * below, was in the same component, with 
the remaining items deemed sufficient to provide stable estimates of each component.  
Six items measured the beliefs and attitudes that are manifested by a disciplinarian 
deity. These revolve on God‘s rewards in heaven, (fear of) punishment, and Satan‘s scheme. 
Four items measuring inerrancy (or literalism) highlighted the belief in the 
comprehensiveness and accuracy of the religious truth and its superiority over man-made 
laws and science. There were also three reversal items that modified these claims. The 
measures of exclusivity included four items—stressing that only one’s faith is truthful and 
comprehensive, and only through which salvation is attainable—and one reversal. Finally, 
five items measured intolerance of other faiths and criticism of one’s religion and two 
reversals.  
After incorporating input from researchers in five of the eight countries (where 
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2010. We then conducted a series of exploratory (EFA) and confirmatory (CFA) factor 
analyses of the items related to each of the four components to arrive at four sets of four 
items (a total of 16 items). We examined these sets to construct a single scale with the desired 
goal of creating a balanced contribution of the four components. EFAs determined that each 
set of four items combining the samples from all countries yielded a single factor for each 
component with Eigenvalues > 1 (accounting for % of the variance) as follows: Deity = 2.12 
(53%), Inerrancy = 1.61 (40%), Exclusivity = 1.78 (45%), and Intolerance = 1.89 (47%). The 
four items in each component were then averaged to yield means across the entire sample: 
Deity = 3.39, Inerrancy = 3.41, Exclusivity = 3.35, Intolerance = 2.60. An EFA of the four 
component means yielded a single factor with Eigenvalue > 1 (2.50) that explained 62.58% 
of the variance.  
We also assessed whether the entire 16 items would provide a reliable scale. Internal 
consistency estimates (Cronbach α) across all countries combined including Egypt with all 
but the excluded items = .82, and using all items when excluding Egypt = .86. A further 
reliability check conducted at the item level for each country resulted in α levels that were 
also in the acceptable range: Tunisia = .88, Lebanon = .88, Iraq = .84, Turkey = .80, Saudi 
Arabia = .75, Jordan = .74, Pakistan = .72, and Egypt = .65. We then averaged the four 
components to create a single fundamentalism score with the intended balance of the four 





 Any infraction of religious instruction will bring about God‘s severe punishment.  
                                                          
5
 The excluded items were: (1) ―Allah requires his slaves to repent (tobbah), and (2) ―Allah is 
the source of everything good.‖  
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 Only the fear of God keeps people on the right path.* 
 Satan is behind any attempt to undermine the belief in God. 




 The Quran (Bible) is true from beginning to end. 
 The Quran (Bible) has correctly predicted all the major events in human history.* 
 In the presence of the Quran (Bible), there is no need for man-made laws. 




 Only Islam (Christianity) provides comprehensive truth about God. 
 Only Islam (Christianity) gives a complete and unfailing guide to human 
salvation. 
 Only Muslims (Christians) are going to heaven.  




                                                          
6
 The excluded items were three reversals: (1) The Quran‘s [Bible‘s (for Christian 
respondents)] description of past historical events is not always accurate; (2) The Quran [the 
Bible (for Christian respondents)] contains general facts, but some of its stories need to be 
interpreted; (3) Different interpretations of the Quran [the Bible (for Christian respondents)] 
are equally valid. The first two questions were disallowed in Egypt. In other countries, the 
first question was negatively linked to fundamentalism, but the other two proved to be 
conceptually vague. 
7
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 Our children should not be allowed to learn about other religions. 
 The followers of other religions should not have the same rights as mine. 
 Criticism of Islam (Christianity) should not be tolerated. 
 Criticism of Muslim (Christian) religious leaders should not be tolerated.  
Predictors of Fundamentalism: National Context 
Religious pluralism 
Two indicators measured this construct: (a) a religious-liberty index as an average of 
religious freedom (1=high, 7=low) and religious persecution (1=low, 10=high) provided by 
The Association for Religion Data Archives (ARDA).
9
 This average is recoded so that higher 
value indicates more religious liberty; and (b) a religious-fractionalization index constructed 
from the distribution of the sample data by religion/sect that is reported in Table 2, using this 
formula: 
                                        
  




                                                                                                                                                                                    
8
 The excluded items were one direct measure—Non-Muslims [Non-Christians (for Christian 
respondents)] should be prohibited from practicing their religion in (Study Site Country) — 
and two reversal questions (1) The followers of all religions should have equal rights to 
practice their religion in (Study Site Country), and (2) Non-Muslims [Non-Christians (for 
Christian respondents)] should be free to build their places of worship in (Study Site 
Country). 
9
 Roger Finke, Christopher Bader, and Andrew Whitehead, 
www.thearda.com/internationalData/. 
10
 Adopted from the Herfindahl ethnic concentration formula (cited in Posner 2004:849). 
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State Structure Fragmentation 
We constructed a fragmentation ratio as the square root of a measure of fractionalized 
elite
11
 divided by political and civil liberties index.
12
 
                     
                     
                                       
 
State intervention in religion 
A government-regulation-of-religion index (GRRI)
13
 was available for 2003-2008 
(averaged) and ranges between 0 (no regulation) and 10 (high regulation). 
Globalization  
We used two measures of globalization. One is economic globalization
14
 as an 
average of standardized measures of International trade—the sum of import and export as 
percentage of GDP—and Foreign capital penetration (FCP). FCP is measured as:  
     
                        
                                     
 
Internet penetration  






 See http://www.thearda.com.  
14
 For GDP, see http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ne.trd.gnfs.zs; for different measure to 
construct FCIP, see http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/bx.klt.dinv.wd.gd.zs, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/bx.klt.dinv.cd.wd, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sl.tlf.totl.in, 
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This was measured as the percentage of the population that had access to the Internet. 
To make these measures more stable, the three-year average of the data on trade, foreign 
capital penetration, and Internet access were constructed where data were available for 2009-
11, 2010-12, and 2012-14, depending on whether the country survey was completed in 2011, 
2013, or 2016, respectively. 
Predictors of Fundamentalism: Individual Level Variables 
Religiosity index 
This index was constructed by averaging three variables: (a) frequency of prayer—
ranging from (1) never, (2) once a year, (2) once or twice a month, (3) once or twice a week, 
(4) once a day, (5) two to four times a day to (6) five times daily; (b) self-described as 
religious—ranging from 1, not at all religious, to 10, very religious; and (c) the importance of 
God in life, ranging from none (1) to utmost important (10).
15
  
Confidence in religious institutions 
This construct was measured by one survey question: ―Please tell me whether you 
have (4) a great deal of confidence in religious institutions, (3) quite a lot of confidence, (2) 
not very much confidence, or (1) none at all?‖ 
Religious modernity index 
This index was constructed as the average of responses to three questions about the 
belief that religious beliefs foster development: ―Would it make your country (1) a lot less 
developed, (2) less developed, (3) more developed, or (4) a lot more developed, if (a) faith in 
Allah increases, (b) the influence of religion on politics increases, and (c) the belief in the 
truth of the Quran [Bible (for Christians)] increases?‖ 
Conspiracy 
                                                          
15
 Mosque attendance is excluded from this index, because the measure carries gender bias; 
across these countries, women are often discouraged attending mosques. 
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One question probed respondents about whether they ―(4) strongly agree, (3) agree, 
(2) disagree, or (1) strongly disagree that there are conspiracies against Muslims (or 
Christians for Christian respondents).‖ 
Xenophobia 
This index was the average of responses to a series of questions on whether 
respondents would like to have as neighbors French, British, Americans, Iranians, Kuwaitis 
in Iraq survey/Indians in Pakistan/Iraqis in other countries, Turkish in Iraq and Saudi 
Arabia/Saudis in other countries, Jordanians in Iraq/Afghanis in Pakistan/Pakistanis in Saudi 
Arabia/Syrians in other countries. The responses were coded as 2 for those mentioning 
―would not like‖ and 1 for those mentioning ―would like‖ to have them as neighbors. 
Fatalism 
Respondents were asked to choose a number between 1 and 10, where 1 = ―people 
shape their fate themselves‖ and 10 ―everything in life is determined by fate.‖ 
Liberalism 
 A liberalism index was created by averaging four components of the construct:  
Expressive-individualism index was the average of three indicators: basis for marriage, a 
woman‘s right to dress as she wishes, and child qualities. Response to the basis for marriage 
was coded as 4 for love and 1 for parental approval, Woman‘s right to dress was coded as 
follows in response to the question: ―Do you (4) strongly agree, (3) agree, (2) disagree, or (1) 
strongly disagree that it is up to a woman to dress as she wishes?‖  For child qualities, 
respondents were asked to select five from a list of 10 favorable qualities for children to have. 
Those who selected ―independence‖ or ―imagination‖ were coded as ―1‖, and those who did 
not select ―religious faith‖ or ―obedience‖ were also coded as ―1‖ (0 = otherwise).  This 
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A gender-equality index was constructed by averaging responses to: ―Do you (1) 
strongly agree, (2) agree, (3) disagree, or (4) strongly disagree that: (a) ―It is acceptable for a 
man to have more than one wife,‖ (b) ―A wife must always obey her husband,‖  (c) ―Men 
make better political leaders,‖ (d) ―University education is more important for boys,‖ and (e) 
―When jobs are scarce, men should have more rights to a job.‖ This index varies between 1 
and 4.  
Secular politicians measured the support for secular politicians in contrast to those 
who are religious. It averaged three indicators: ―Do you (1) strongly agree, (2) agree, (3) 
disagree, or (4) strongly disagree that: (a) It would be better for your country if more people 
with strong religious beliefs held public office; (b) Religious leaders should not interfere in 
politics?‖ The answers to this question were recoded so that higher values indicated stronger 
agreement.  
 A secular politics index was constructed by averaging responses to three questions as 
follows. ―Do you (4) strongly agree, (3) agree, (2) disagree, or (1) strongly disagree that your 
country would be a better place if religion and politics were separated.‖ ―Would it be (1) very 
good, (2) fairly good, (3) fairly bad, or (4) very bad for your country to have an Islamic 
government [Christian government for Christian respondents], where religious authorities 
have absolute power.‖ And ―Is it (1) very important, (2) important, (3) somewhat important, 
(4) least important, or (5) not at all important for a good government to implement only the 
sharia (for Muslims) or the laws inspired only by Christian values (for Christians)?‖ Answers 
to this question were adjusted to range between 1 and 4. The average of the four components 
made a liberalism index, where higher values indicated stronger liberal orientations and 
weaker conservatism. 
Sources of information 
 RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM 
 
 
Two indices assessed respondents‘ sources of information. One was the extent to 
which the respondents trusted family or friends as sources of information about religion, 
consisting of the average of responses to two questions: ―How much do you trust what (a) 
family members or (b) friends tell you about the role of religion in politics: (4) a great deal, 
(3) some, (2) not very much, or (1) none at all?‖ The second, a plurality-of-information-
sources index, was based on averaging how much respondents rely on (a) the radio, (b) 
foreign (satellite) TV, (c) newspapers, (d) the Internet, and  (e) Mobile as a source of 
information, ranging from (1) not at all, (2) not very much, (3) some, to (4) a great deal. 
Demographics 
A socioeconomic-status index was created by averaging education coded in nine 
categories ranging from no formal education (1) to university degree (9), and household 
income coded as (1) for the lowest decile and (10) for the highest.
16
 Employment, gender, 
marital status and rural area, were included as dummy variables; employed (=1, 
0=otherwise), male (=1, 0=female), and married (=1, 0=otherwise), and Age as reported by 
respondents. 
Coded as rural were those areas with populations of 10,000 or less (=1) and 0 with 
more than 10,000. For Saudi Arabia, information was available only for the size of town 
below 500,000 (coded as 1) and more than 500,000 (coded as 0). Other dummy variables 
were also created to specify religious identity: Christian, Druze, Shia, Muslims (sect 
unidentified) and others. Sunni was used as the reference category; and ethnicity: Arab 
(versus non-Arab for Lebanon, versus Kurd for Iraq, and versus Berber for Tunisia); 
Jordanians (versus Palestinians for Jordan); Turk (versus Kurd for Turkey); and Punjabi 
                                                          
16
 For Jordan, both education and income had seven categories. In order to retain the 
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(versus Pathani, Sindhi, Kashmiri, and others for Pakistan) were used as the reference 
categories.  
Hypotheses 
Based on our analytical framework and these measures, we predicted that 
fundamentalism would be stronger in countries characterized by:  
H1: Weaker religious liberty and diversity,  
H2: Lower state structure’s fragmentation ratio, and higher government regulation 
of religion, and 
H3: Weaker economic or cultural globalization. 
On the individual level, fundamentalism was predicted to be associated with: 
H1: Higher religiosity, higher trust in religious institution, and stronger belief in 
religious modernity, 
H2: Higher xenophobia, stronger belief in conspiracy, and higher fatalism, 
H3: Weaker liberal outlooks (higher conservatism), 
H4: Greater trust in family and friends as a source of information about the political 
role of religion, and lower reliance on diverse information sources, and 





ANOVA was used to assess the degree of inter-country variance in fundamentalism, 
and correlation coefficients to examine the associations between the country level variables 
and the aggregated level of fundamentalism. Individual level analyses were treated separately 
                                                          
17
 Employing Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) would have been ideal. This was not 
possible, however, due to the small number of countries (see Raudenbush and Bryk 1992).  
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for each country, using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models to estimate the 
relationships between individual characteristics and fundamentalism. We employed 
hierarchical regression to provide additional information about the contribution of different 
sets of variables to fundamentalism. The absence of some of the variables in several countries 
precluded conducting a regression analysis using pooled data across all countries.  
RESULTS 
Between-Country Analysis 
As shown in Table 3, the level of fundamentalism is high (Mean = 3.21 on a 1 to 4-pt. 
scale) summed across all countries. Results of a one-way ANOVA showed statistically 
significant variance (F7,23245 = 793.00, p < .000001) among the countries, which is not 
surprising because of the large sample size (n > 23,000) and thus the high power to detect 
small differences. Nevertheless, these differences can be considered substantial according to 
effect size estimates (Cohen 1977). Since effect sizes for 
2
 greater than .14 are considered 
large, the value of 
2
 = .19 in the present case provides justification that between-country 
variance in fundamentalism can be considered statistically relatively large over and above the 
statistical significance that is a function of the very high power. Post-hoc Scheffé paired-
comparison significance tests (at p < .0001) were conducted to determine which countries 
differed. These are indicated by means with different superscripts in Table 3. Accordingly, 
fundamentalism was highest in Egypt and Pakistan, followed by Saudi Arabia, then Iraq and 
Jordan, and successively lower, respectively, in Tunisia, Turkey, and finally lowest in 
Lebanon. 
Table 3 about here 
 Table 4 presents the measures of the country level constructs—religious pluralism, 
the state‘s structure and intervention, and globalization. The table also shows the correlations 
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Pluralistic versus monolithic religious context 
The two variables measuring the extent to which the religious context is monolithic or 
pluralistic—religious-liberty index and religious-fractionalization index—are both negatively 
connected to fundamentalism (r = -.62 and -.65, respectively). These linkages thus support 
our interpretation that religious diversity and religious liberty provide favorable conditions 
for individuals to freely pursue their religious preferences and therefore weaken overall 
fundamentalism on the national level. 
Fragmentation of state structure and regulation of religion 
Fragmentation ratio is also negatively linked to fundamentalism (r = -.66). It indicates 
elite rivalries, which tend to generate the space for the rise of discursive diversity within 
society and thus weakening of fundamentalism. Government regulation of religion index, on 
the other hand, is positively linked to fundamentalism (r = .81), supporting our hypothesis 
that the more the government intervenes in religion, the higher the likelihood of the rise of 
religious fundamentalism.   
Globalization 
Both economic globalization and Internet penetration are negatively linked to 
fundamentalism (r = -.55, and -.52, respectively). These findings run contrary to the notion 
that globalization fosters fundamentalism. Globalization effect on fundamentalism, however, 
appears to be weaker than that of religious diversity, state structure and regulation of religion 
. 
Table 4 about here 
Individual Level Analysis 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for individual-level variables. Tables 6 to 10 
provide results of hierarchical linear regression models (standardized regression estimates – 
β), which begin with a baseline of demographics (Model 1 – Table 6), then successively the 
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variance and increased variance accounted for by adding categories of variables designated as 
religious and ethnic identity (Model 2 – Table 7), religion (Model 3 – Table 8), perceptions 
and values (Model 4 – Table 9) and sources of information (Model 5 – Table 10).  In view of 
the large number of variables, we tested the models for possible multicolinearity, which was 
found to be negligible. Most of the variables had variance inflation factors (VIF) less than 2.0 
and none exceeding or even close to 5.0 above which there is reason for concern. Taking the 
models in turn, demographics alone accounted for between 2% (Iraq) and 10% (Turkey) of 
the variance (Model 1). Religious and ethnic minorities accounted for between .6% (Egypt) 
and 21% (KSA) additional variance, after controlling for demographics (model 2), religion 
variables for another 4% (Jordan) and 26% (Lebanon) after controlling for demographics and 
religious/ethnic minorities (model 3), and perception and values further add between 3% 
(Saudi Arabia) and 14% (Tunisia) to the variance (Model 4), and finally, sources of 
information add between .1% (Tunisia) and 3% (Saudi Arabia), controlling for all other 
variable sets, all of which are statistically significant increases (Model 5).  It should be noted 
of course that the increases depend on the order in which the variables are entered. All 
variables combined accounted for between 13% (Egypt) and 51% (Lebanon) of the total 
variance. Although regression estimates vary across models, a function of which variables are 
in the model, since most estimates are relatively stable and have similar levels of statistical 
significance, we focus on the final model (Model 5) to discuss the results. 
Tables 5-9 about here 
Demographics 
Most notably, fundamentalism is lower for those with higher socioeconomic status, 
which is consistent across the eight countries. The strength of this relationship, however, 
varies between countries, from the standardized regression magnitudes of  -.126 in Tunisia to 
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across the eight countries. People living in rural areas are significantly more fundamentalist 
than those in urban areas in Egypt, Turkey, and Lebanon (β = .086, .049, and .102, 
respectively); but the opposite is the case in Pakistan and Iraq (β = -.044 and -.042, 
respectively). There is no urban-rural difference in Tunisia or Jordan. Data for Saudi Arabia 
were available only for the size of towns between those below and over populations of 
500,000. In this case, our analysis shows that people residing in areas with less than 500,000 
were more strongly fundamentalist than those residing in areas with populations greater than 
500,000 (β = .310).  It should be noted that SES and residence results are independent effects 
since each controls for the other regression estimate and can be considered additive. In other 
words, especially high levels of fundamentalism were present for persons residing in rural 
areas who in addition have lower SES. 
Religious and ethnic identity 
As we hypothesized, members of religious minorities were consistently less 
fundamentalist than those in the majority. Minority Shia were less fundamentalist compared 
to Sunnis in Pakistan, especially in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Turkey (mostly Alavi Shia), and 
Lebanon (β = -.038, -.561, -.115, -.037, and -.160, respectively), Druze and other religious 
minorities to Sunnis in Lebanon (β = -.108 and -.119, respectively), and Christians compared 
to Sunnis in Pakistan, Jordan, and Lebanon (β = -.084, -.154, and -.111, respectively). There 
was no significant difference between Sunni Muslims and Christians in Egypt. When only 
demographics and religion variables (Tables 7 & 8) are controlled, Christians were less 
fundamentalist than Sunni Muslims in Egypt. Those who identified themselves as only 
Muslim were less fundamentalist in Iraq (β = -.233), although more so in Turkey (β = .051), 
but not significantly different from Sunnis in Pakistan and Lebanon. Those identified with 
much smaller groups or no religious identity were less fundamentalist in Pakistan and 
Lebanon (β = -.133, -.109, respectively).  
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Fundamentalism is lower among members of ethnic minorities and than those in the 
majority, but about the same in only two cases. In Pakistan, fundamentalism is weaker among 
Sindhis, Pathans, and Others than Punjabis (β = -.076, -.050, and -.100, respectively), but not 
significantly different between Punjabis and Kashmiris. Less fundamentalist were also 
Berbers and others in Tunisia and others in Lebanon than Arabs (β = -.054, -.039, and -.032, 
respectively), Palestinians than Jordanians in Jordan (β = -.059), and Kurds than Turks in 
Turkey (β = -.036). But Iraqi Kurds were not significantly different from Iraqi Arabs. To 
explain the two exceptional cases, we postulate that where ethnic minorities are 
predominantly concentrated in a region of the country and enjoy substantial autonomy from 
the central government—like Iraqi Kurds or Pakistani Kashmiris—they exhibit no significant 
difference in fundamentalism with those in ethnic majority. On the other hand, ethnic 
minorities are less fundamentalist, where they are relatively more dispersed among, and thus 
interact more often with, the ethnic majority (e.g., Berbers in Tunisia, Sindhis, Pathans, and 
Others in Pakistan, Others in Lebanon, Palestinians in Jordan, Kurds in Turkey). This area, 
however, requires further empirical research. 
Religion 
Except in Egypt where religiosity has no significant link to fundamentalism, all other 
religious-related variables are related to fundamentalism.
18
 Religiosity is positively linked to 
fundamentalism in the other seven countries (βs between .051 for Jordan and .231 for 
Lebanon), and to trust in religious institutions across all the countries (βs between .032 for 
                                                          
18 One reason for a lack of significant relationship between religiosity and fundamentalism 
among Egyptians is that these variables have low variability. The standard deviations for 
religiosity and fundamentalism were .83 and .33, respectively, both lowest across the eight 
countries, while the mean fundamentalism was highest and religiosity was the second highest 
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Pakistan and .133 for Tunisia). These findings confirmed similar results from other contexts 
reported in the literature (e.g., Peshkin 1988; Ammerman 1987; Kellstedt and Smidt 1991; 
Blaydes and Linzer 2008; Moaddel and Karabenick 2008, 2013). Finally, the belief in 
religious modernity is significantly linked to fundamentalism across six countries where data 
on this construct were available (βs between .080 for Egypt and .286 for Lebanon), 
supporting the connection between the belief that religious beliefs foster development and 
fundamentalism. This finding suggests that, while fundamentalism may be a reaction to 
secular modernity (Antoun 2008; Lawrence 1989; Kaplan 1992; Riesebrodt 1993; Almond, 
Appleby, Sivan 2003), it is not against development, reflecting adherence to religious 
modernity. As Iranian Muslim intellectual Shariati (1969:23; Hanson 1983) stated, ―Europe 
abandoned religion and made progress, [while] we abandoned religion and went backward.‖ 
This linkage may also explain why fundamentalism in such contexts as Pakistan under 
General Zia al-Haqq or Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Talbot 1998; Hussain 1999; 
Mohiuddin 2007; Gumuscu and Sert 2009) displayed strong support for economic 
development. Altogether, the robustness of these three predictors across the countries 
supports the view that this multifactor measure of religion, as conceived here, is an important 
contributor to the study of religious fundamentalism.  
Perceptions and values 
The perception that there are conspiracies against Muslims is positively linked to 
fundamentalism in every country except Tunisia (βs are between .054 in Turkey and .292 in 
Iraq). In Tunisia, the size of the correlation coefficient between the belief in conspiracy and 
fundamentalism is much smaller than the size of its coefficient with liberalism (r = .082 
versus -.126, respectively, both significant). In all other countries, by contrast, the size of the 
correlation coefficient between the belief in conspiracy and fundamentalism is either larger 
than the size of its coefficient with liberalism or close to it. As a result, the link between the 
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belief in conspiracy and fundamentalism is insignificance when liberalism index is in the 
regression equation but significant when it is removed from the equation. Xenophobia is 
positively linked to fundamentalism in five of the seven countries: Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, 
Tunisia, and Lebanon (β = .033, .037, .082, .114, and .096, respectively). When religiosity, 
trust in religious institutions, and liberalism index are removed, its link with fundamentalism 
is significant in Turkey. Among Iraqis, on the other hand, the question of xenophobia is a bit 
complicated. Because of intense inter-ethnic and sectarian rivalries between Kurds, Shia, and 
Sunnis, attitudes toward neighboring countries vary considerably across these three groups 
(for example, Shia have stronger favorable attitudes toward Iran and Kuwait than either 
Kurds or Sunnis). Thus, the measure is not as stable as it is in other countries and may not be 
appropriate to use for Iraq. Questions related to xenophobia were not permitted in Saudi 
Arabia.  
Suspicion of outsiders, as measured by the belief in conspiracies and xenophobia, 
when considered in conjunction with membership in the dominant religion, indicate the 
significance of sectarian rivalries in shaping fundamentalism. This finding is not only 
consistent with the literature (Handy 1991; Breault 1989; Blau, Land, and Redding 1992; 
Blau, Redding, and Land 1993), but also points to a connection between religious 
fundamentalism and national chauvinism. Fatalism is consistently and positively linked to 
fundamentalism across all countries (βs are between .039 for Turkey and .173 in Tunisia). As 
expected, the liberalism index is markedly inversely linked to fundamentalism across all of 
the countries, from -.150 in KSA and Iraq to -.365 in Turkey. Alternatively, conservatism is 
positively linked to fundamentalism. 
Sources of information 
Regression estimates showed that fundamentalism is positively linked to trusting 
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Pakistanis, Egyptians, Saudis, and Lebanese (β = .032, .070, .115, and .057, respectively), but 
not significantly among Iraqis. This relationship is consistent with findings in the literature on 
the role of family in shaping people‘s religious preferences (Ellison 1995). This question was 
not included in the surveys in the other three countries.  Reliance on the plurality of 
information sources, on the other hand, is consistently negatively linked to fundamentalism 
across all the countries (βs range between  -.162 for Saudi Arabia and -.035 for Turkey), 
except among Iraqis, where this relationship is positive (β = .057).  We postulate that the 
intensification of sectarian rivalries in Iraq might have contributed to the sectarianism of the 
media—where each group preferred to relay on their sectarian sources of information. As a 
result, reliance on these sources tended to reinforce, rather than weakening, fundamentalism. 
In sum, our analysis at the individual level show that a higher level of fundamentalism 
is linked to: (a) religion in different ways—religiosity, confidence in religious institutions, 
and religious modernity; (b) stronger xenophobia and beliefs in conspiracy; (c) higher 
fatalism and weaker liberal outlooks; (d) a higher trust in family and friends as information 
sources about religion and less reliance on diverse sources of information; and (e) lower 
socioeconomic status and membership in ethnic majority, dominant religion or sect. 
Table 10 about here 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study was designed to advance the social-scientific study of fundamentalism in 
several respects. First, to address the challenges to the study of the subject posed by (a) the 
diversity of fundamentalist movements, (b) the controversy over the concept in the Islamic 
context, and (c) the variability of its operational definitions in the literature, we 
conceptualized the term as a set of core beliefs about and attitudes toward religion that rested 
on a disciplinarian conception of the deity, literalism, religious exclusivity and intolerance. 
Our conceptualization thus captures the common features underpinning the diversity of 
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fundamentalist movements in Christianity and Islam. Whether Shia, Sunni, or Christian 
fundamentalists, they are more likely to adhere to a disciplinarian deity, believe in the literal 
truth of the scriptures, espouse an exclusivist view of their religious community, and be 
intolerant of other religions than people who are not. Our analyses of the data from cross-
nationally comparable representative samples of respondents in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Turkey supported combining these components to form 
a single fundamentalism scale. A stable yardstick was thus created to compare 
fundamentalism across religions, religious sects, and nations. 
Second, our analysis showed that aggregate fundamentalism was higher in countries 
where religious liberty or diversity was more restricted, state regulation of religion greater 
and authoritarian structure less fragmented, and the national context less globalized. Third, on 
the micro (individual) level, our analysis also indicated that fundamentalism was stronger 
among individuals who were of a lower socioeconomic status, members of the dominant 
religion/sect or ethnic majority, more religious, expressing greater confidence in religious 
institutions, and stronger believers in religious modernity, less liberal (more conservative), 
stronger believers in conspiracy, more xenophobic, more fatalistic, more trusting of what 
family and friends tell them about political role of religion, and relying less on diverse 
sources of information. The minor exceptions to this general pattern were noted, explained, 
and considered not a serious deviation from this general pattern. 
These findings have ramifications for our understanding of fundamentalism on a 
higher level of empirical generalization and theoretical abstraction than in the existing 
literature. First, given our cross-sectional data it would be hard to assess the extent to which 
fundamentalism is a reaction to changes in each of the seven countries that would warrant 
causal conclusions, such as responses to changes in socioeconomic status or state 
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consistent evidence. Generally, fundamentalism on the macro (country) level is higher where 
freedom to engage in religion is restricted by (a) state structure and policies, and (b) religious 
monopoly. It is weakened under the conditions of (a) religious liberty, and (b) cultural 
diversity provided by globalization. On this level, the key variables related to cross-national 
variation in aggregate fundamentalism revolve on religious unfreedom and monopoly. On the 
(micro) individual level, we showed that fundamentalism does not appear to be a reaction to 
modernity per se. In fact, it is strongly linked to a religious conception of modernity qua 
development, where religious belief is believed to foster development. On this level, 
however, although fundamentalism has multiple determinants, its strength relates to religion 
(religiosity, religious modernity, and trust in religious institutions), personal inefficacy 
(subjectively [fatalism] and objectively [lower socioeconomic status]), illiberal values, 
outgroup hostility (xenophobia, conspiracy, religious or ethnic domination), and monolithic 
information source.  
As noted above, we fully recognize that while we have advanced possible 
explanations of the subject, our cross-sectional data precludes definitive causal claims, which 
would require collecting data at multiple points in time. Even though fundamentalism is 
treated statistically as a dependent variable, we do not rule out reciprocal causations or that 
the direction of causality to be just the opposite of what our model has specified. From our 
perspective, the specified factors are statistical predictors of fundamentalism and that our 
model is one way of interpreting the pattern of relationship between the variables. 
Nonetheless, these societal conditions and personal characteristics that are linked to the 
measure of the construct as orientations toward religion rather than religious beliefs 
themselves advance the social-scientific study of fundamentalism in an empirically more 
generalizable and theoretically more abstract manner.  
 RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM 
 
 
With that foundation, we suggest that future research move in several directions. One 
is to apply the analytical framework employed here to study Jewish fundamentalism and 
examine whether the same or similar set of variables predict fundamentalist orientations 
among Jews, particularly in Israel. We also suggest applying our measurement of the 
construct to examine fundamentalism in such atheistic or nontheistic religions as 
Brahmanism, Buddhism, and Jainism. For sure, the disciplinarian conception of the deity, one 
of the components of fundamentalism, may not be directly applicable to Eastern religions. 
However, given that our indicators of this component revolve on the notion of reward and 
punishment from God, a similar set of measures may be formulated that focuses on a 
retributive conception of karma that stresses on the severity of punishment in the next life 
from misdeed in this life. Finally, another line of research is to go beyond religion and 
develop parallel measures that tap into fundamentalism in other belief systems, including 
secular fundamentalism such as the literalism, group-centrism, and intolerance displayed 
among the followers of different secular ideologies.  This line of research may produce the 
necessary empirical evidence in order to construct a more general conception of 
fundamentalism that includes both religious and secular variants. We hope that the present 
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Data Collection Institution 
or Firm 
Egypt  3,143 June-Aug 2011 93 ERTC, Cairo 
Iraq  3,000 Jan-Feb 2011 88 IIACSS, Baghdad 
Jordan 3,008 Apr-May 2016 80 U of Jordan, Amman 
Lebanon  3,034 Mar-July 2011 61 ICOD & Am. U., Beirut 
Pakistan  3,523 May-Sept 2011 83 U of Agriculture, Faisalabad 
KSA  1,635 Jan-Feb 2011 73 PARK, Jeddah 
Tunisia  3,070 Mar-May 2013 78 ELKA Consulting, Tunis 
Turkey  3,019 Apr-June 2013 62 FREKANS, Istanbul 
KSA = Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
 
Table 2 Respondents’ Demographic Characteristics (%) 
Sample 
characteristics 
Pakistan Egypt KSA Iraq Jordan Lebanon Tunisia Turkey 
Mean age 35 39 34 36 42 35 44 41 
Male 51 48 50 53 50 59 45 44 
University 
education 
4 17 17 13 17 28 17 13 
Married 76 82 64 70 74 50 66  
Religion:         
Sunni 90.0 96 92 40 97 23 99 86 
Shi‘a 8.6 - 8 31  33 - 2 
Allawi        4 




- 29  3 - 7 
Druze      6 - - 
Christian 1.4 4 - <1 3 27 - - 
KSA = Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
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SD .33 .32 .41 .41 .34 .46 .55 .59 .49 
N 3,142 3,523 1,506 2,991 3,008 3,065 2,994 3,024 23,253 
Note: F7,23245 = 793.00, p < .000001.  
2
 = .19, which is a large effect size = >.14 
according to Cohen (1977). Post-hoc Scheffé paired comparisons: means with 
different superscripts are significantly different at p < .001.  KSA = Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia 
Table 4 National Aggregate Religious Fundamentalism and Measures of National 
Context 
Variables Pakistan Egypt KSA Iraq Tunisia Jordan Turkey Lebanon r* with 
fundam. Fundamentalism 3.42 3.44 3.33 3.27 3.18 3.26 2.97 2.80 
1. Religious pluralism          
A. Religious liberty 3.5 3.5 4 1 5 6 5.5 6.5 – .62b 
B. Religious 
fractionalization 
.18 .08 .15 .50 .02 .06 .21 .81 – .65
b
 
2. State structure & 
intervention 
         
 A. Fragmentation ratio 0.34 0.26 0.21 0.28 0.35 0.23 0.47 0.37 – .66
b
 
 B. Gov. regulation of relig. 
index 
8.8 8.3 9.8 6 6.2 8.6 5.2 4.9   .81
c
 
3. Globalization          
A. Economic 
globalization** 
-2.37 -1.56 1.22 -0.76 0.47 1.56 -1.23 2.67 – .55
a
 
a) International trade  32.67 49.67 84.67 73.67 102.67 118.00 54.33 97.00  
b) Foreign capital 
penetration 
1.43 4.23 22.56 4.00 5.32 17.93 5.93 34.38  
B. Internet 8.17 22.40 42.17 2.87 39.10 46.67 42.67 41.93 – .52
a
 
*Pearson correlation coefficients **Linear combination of standardized international trade 
and foreign capital penetration 
a
p  <  0.1   
b
p  < .05  
c
p < .01. Note: These are all considered large effect 
sizes according to Cohen (1977).  
KSA = Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
Table 5 Aggregate Individual Variable Descriptive Statistics for Each Country: Mean (SD) 
Variable 
(Response range) 
Pakistan Egypt KSA Jordan Iraq Tunisia Turkey Lebanon 
Demographics 
Socioeconomic status 
(1 – 10) 
4.01 4.40 5.61 3.10 3.62 5.24 4.07 5.87 
(1.58) (1.96) (1.63) (.86) (1.65) (1.51) (1.81) (1.85) 
Employed 
(0 - 1) 
.48 .44 .37 .29 .43 .38 .34 .61 
(.50) (.50) (.48) (.45) (.49) (.49) (.48) (.49) 
Male 
(0 - 1) 
.51 .48 .50 .50 .53 .44 .44 .59 
(.50) (.50) (.50) (.50) (.50) (.50) (.50) (.49) 
Not Married .21 .19 .32 .21 .24 .27 .21 .42 
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(0 - 1) (.41) (.39) (.47) (.41) (.43) (.45) (.41) (.49) 
Age 
(18 - 80) 
35 39 34 42 36 44 41 35 
(12.02) (14.74) (13.39) (15.65) (13.00) (17.03) (16.13) (12.83) 
Rural 
(0 -1) 
.53 .20  .18 .52 .29 .82 .59 
(.50) (.40)  (.38) (.50) (.45) (.39) (.49) 
Religion 
Religiosity Index 
(0 - 10) 
7.13 7.55 7.34 7.66 7.48 7.02 7.03 6.40 
(.95) (.83) (1.01) (.96) (.98) (1.32) (1.40) (1.80) 
Confidence in Rel. Inst. 
(1 - 4) 
2.97 3.63 3.32 3.75 3.08 3.57 2.77 2.45 
(.81) (.67) (.78) (.60) (.78) (.86) (1.01) (.90) 
Religious Modernity 
(1 - 4) 
3.74 3.39 3.21  3.17  2.78 2.65 
(.37) (.52) (.56)  (.57)  (.65) (.73) 
Perception & Values 
Conspiracy against 
Muslims 
(1 – 4) 
3.48 3.36 3.22 3.49 3.08 3.31 2.86 2.91 
(.65) (.89) (.81) (.74) (1.00) (.92) (.79) (.98) 
Xenophobia 
(1 - 2) 
1.66 1.72  1.52 1.66 1.42 1.46 1.46 
(.34) (.30)  (.35) (.31) (.35) (.45) .37 
Fatalism 
(1 - 10) 
6.29 7.41 5.25 7.31 6.10 7.65 5.14 5.77 
(1.96) (2.80) (2.69) (3.09) (2.35) (2.86) (2.87) (2.66) 
Liberalism Index 
(1 - 4) 
1.98 2.08 2.24 2.15 2.23 2.48 2.63 2.72 
(.45) (.42) (.42) (.40) (.39) (.53) (.48) (.49) 
Sources of Information 
Family/Friends 
(1-4) 
3.12 3.21 3.24  3.30   2.99 
(.50) (.78) (.70)  (.58)   (.68) 
Plurality of Info Sources 
(1 – 4) 
2.51 1.58 2.50 1.87 1.87 1.94 1.63 2.23 
(.53) (.54) (.69) (.66) (.64) (.67) (.62) (.70) 
KSA = Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  
Table 6 Hierarchical Linear Regression Estimates () Prediction of Fundamentalism – Model 
1 






















Male -.002 -.002 -.076
a












 -.030 .042 -.059
b
 .022 .018 -.066
b
 .020 
































df regression/df residual 3378/6 2775/6 1501/6 2897/6 2488/6 2483/6 2335/6 2432/6 
R
2
 .086 .052 .080 .043 .024 .074 .104 .069 
a
p < .05    
b
p < .01   
c
p < .001
    d
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Table 7 Hierarchical Linear Regression Estimates () Prediction of Fundamentalism – Model 
2 






















Male -.010 -.002 -.092
b









 -.032 -.028 
Age .126
d
 -.028 .024 -.017 .018 .024 -.070
b
 .038 

























Druze vs. Sunni        -.192
d
 
Muslim (Sect unidentified) 
vs. Sunni 











    -.310
d
 




Sindhi vs. Punjabi -.097
d
        
Pathan vs. Punjabi .058
c
        
Kashmiri vs. Punjabi .130
d
        






Kurd vs. Turk 
    -.001 -.109
d
 -.007  
Palestinian vs. Jordanian     -.063
b


















df regression/df residual 3370/14 2774/7 1500/7 2895/8 2484/10 2481/8 2331/10 2426/12 
R
2





 .210 .054 .017
d
 .015 .023 .132 
a
p < .05    
b
p < .01   
c
p < .001
    d
p < .0001      KSA = Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
 
Table 8 Hierarchical Linear Regression Estimates () Prediction of Fundamentalism – Model 
3 



















Employed .018 .017 -.033 .007 -.003 -.031 -.052
b
 -.016 





Not Married -.028 -.018 -.031 -.022 -.010 -.052
a
 .004 .024 
Age .053
b
 -.027 .002 -.037 .009 -.009 -.056
b
 .007 
 RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM 
 
 

























Druze vs. Sunni        -.127
d
 
Muslim (Sect unidentified) 
vs. Sunni 













    -.203
d
 
Other vs. Sunni -.167
d




Sindhi vs. Punjabi -.092
d
        
Pathan vs. Punjabi .008        
Kashmiri vs. Punjabi .046
b
        
Other vs. Punjabi/Arab -.107
d






Arab/Kurd vs. Turk 




 .00  
Palestinian vs. Jordanian    -.061
b
































































df regression/df residual 3367/17 2771/10 1497/10 2893/10 2481/13 2479/10 2328/13 2423/15 
R
2





















p < .05    
b
p < .01   
c
p < .001
    d
p < .0001      KSA = Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
 
Table 9 Hierarchical Linear Regression Estimates () Prediction of Fundamentalism – Model 
4 



















Employed .025 .021 -.028 .001 -.015 -.025 -.041
a
 -.010 
Male -.012 -.001 -.043 -.014 .018 -.005 .021 -.034
b
 
Not Married .014 -.013 -.032 -.013 -.006 -.037 .002 .030 
Age -.026 -.020 -.019 -.033 .000 .001 -.033 -.017 



























Druze vs. Sunni        -.111
d
 
Muslim (Sect unidentified) 
vs. Sunni 





Christian vs. Sunni -.083
d
 -.030  -.154
d
    -.118
d
 
Other vs. Sunni -.129
d
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Ethnic Identity 
Sindhi vs. Punjabi -.077
d
        
Pathan vs. Punjabi -.045
b
        
Kashmiri vs. Punjabi .024        
Other vs. Punjabi/Arab -.094
a






Arab/Kurd vs. Turk 





Palestinian vs. Jordanian    -.060
b 










































   .219 .285
d
 
















































































df regression/df residual 3363/21 2767/14 1494/13 2889/14 2477/17 2475/14 2328/17 2419/19 
R
2





















p < .05    
b
p < .01   
c
p < .001
    d
p < .0001     KSA = Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
 
Table 10 Hierarchical Linear Regression Estimates () Prediction of Fundamentalism – 
Model 5 



















Employed .027 .025 -.016 .004 -.018 -.023 -.041
a
   .006 
Male -.006 -.001 -.017 -.010 .014 .002 .022 -.024 
Not Married .016 -.009 -.036 -.010 -.007 -.027 .004 .036 
Age -.031 -.015 -.040 -.040 .004 -.013 -.037 -.025 



























Druze vs. Sunni        -.108
d
 
Muslim (Sect unidentified) vs. 
Sunni 





Christian vs. Sunni -.084
d
 -.033  -.154
d
    -.111
d
 
Other vs. Sunni -.133
d




Sindhi vs. Punjabi -.076
d
        
Pathan vs. Punjabi -.050
b
        
 RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM 
 
 
Kashmiri vs. Punjabi .021        
Other vs. Punjabi/Arab -.100
d





Kurd/Berber vs. Arab/Kurd 
vs. Turk 





Palestinian vs. Jordanian    -.059
b










































  .218 .286
d
 
Perception & Values 



































































  .012   .057
d
 


































df regression/df residual 3361/23 2765/16 1492/1
5 


























p < .05    
b
p < .01   
c
p < .001
    d
p < .0001   KSA = Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
 
 
 
